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GOOD FAITH REJECTION OF GOODS IN A FALLING MARKET 
JEFFREY M. DRESSLER 
 
This Note analyzes the intersection of two fundamental components of 
American sales law under the Uniform Commercial Code: the perfect 
tender rule and the duty of good faith.  It focuses on cases in which buyers 
of goods use their right to perfect tender to avoid purchasing goods that 
have become diminished in value.  Some commentators, and, indeed, some 
courts, have argued that such conduct runs afoul of parties’ underlying 
duty of good faith in the performance of contracts.  This Note rejects this 
position, and, instead, argues that if goods are truly non-conforming—even 
if only “trivially” non-conforming—buyers should retain their right of 
rejection irrespective of the hardship this may impose on the seller of 
goods.  In short, this Note suggests that the duty of good faith should never 
override a party’s otherwise tenable right of rejection and advocates a 
judicial framework that can allow courts to deal with difficult cases in a 
way that is consistent with the intent of the parties and conducive to the 
development of a more predictable body of contract law. 
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GOOD FAITH REJECTION OF GOODS IN A FALLING MARKET  
JEFFREY M. DRESSLER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Modern contracts literature is ripe with discussions of the duty of good 
faith under Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”).  
Likewise, the rules governing a buyer’s right to reject non-conforming 
goods under section 2-601—better known as the perfect tender rule—have 
been vigorously debated.  The two issues often intersect.  While the perfect 
tender rule may suggest that a buyer possesses an unwavering right to 
reject in certain circumstances, the duty of good faith may suggest an 
obligation to use some degree of equitable restraint in invoking this right 
so as to not exploit the seller.  Nowhere is this dynamic more apparent than 
in cases where the merits of a particular rejection are challenged against 
the backdrop of a falling market1 that might lead a reasonable observer to 
suspect that the buyer’s rejection was actually motivated by a desire to 
escape from a bad bargain rather than out of legitimate dissatisfaction with 
any non-conformities in the goods tendered.  Exploring this area requires a 
survey of the contrasting views of the obligation of good faith, however, 
this Note does not seek to add to the philosophical debate about what good 
faith should be.  Instead, this Note tackles the more pragmatic task of 
demonstrating why current conceptions of good faith should not be used to 
restrict the force of the perfect tender rule, especially in the context of 
sophisticated commercial parties.  Ultimately, the goal is to articulate 
under what circumstances a buyer may reject goods in a falling market, 
and whether sellers should be permitted to offer evidence of a falling 
market in order to establish that the buyer rejected in bad faith. 
This Note argues that buyers should be entitled to reject goods that are 
truly, even if only trivially, non-conforming regardless of the economic 
hardship this imposes on a seller.  Further, this Note argues that plaintiff-
sellers should not be permitted to use evidence of a falling market in order 
to establish that such rejection was made in bad faith.  To get there, Part II 
tackles the sticky issue of defining when goods are non-conforming.  It 
                                                                                                                          
* University of Connecticut, B.A. 2006; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 
2010.  I would like to thank Professor Kurt Strasser for his tremendous guidance in writing this Note 
and for inspiring my interest in contract law.  I would also like to thank my colleagues on Connecticut 
Law Review for their hard work editing this Note.  All errors are mine and mine alone.  This Note is 
dedicated to my parents for their unending support. 
1 Throughout this Note, the term “falling market” is used as a shorthand to describe a situation in 
which the fair market value of goods falls significantly between the time the buyer agrees to purchase 
them from a seller and the time the goods are actually delivered. 
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argues that any defect that impinges on the bargain the parties struck 
should be deemed a non-conformity under the perfect tender rule.  As 
many cases show, this may include “trivial” defects if they do in fact bear 
such significance to the parties’ bargain.  Part II also surveys good faith, 
ultimately concluding that the most useful model for understanding good 
faith in this context is an excluder model that repudiates any conduct 
failing to satisfy the two types of conduct affirmatively required for good 
faith under the U.C.C.: honesty and commercial reasonableness.  Part III 
then analyzes cases that have dealt with contested rejections and, 
specifically, cases where sellers relied on arguments that the buyer’s 
rejection was made in bad faith to escape a bad bargain caused by a falling 
market for the goods.  The cases indicate a divide between courts that 
factor falling market evidence into their reasoning, and those that either 
refuse to admit such evidence, or are not persuaded by it.  As such, this 
area of the law is worthy of more study and, hopefully with time, more 
consistency. 
With this as a starting point, Part IV argues that courts should resist the 
urge to use falling market conditions as evidence of a bad faith rejection 
because this type of evidence does not help determine if a non-conformity 
in the goods actually exists; only the terms of the contract and the relevant 
commercial standards help in this regard.  Further—assuming a non-
conformity does exist—it is not bad faith to act on it in a falling market 
because doing so is both honest and commercially reasonable.  It is honest 
because, having already established that a non-conformity exists, the 
honesty prong of good faith should be treated as a nullity in this narrow 
context.  This is so because, even conceding that the falling market was a 
factor that made the non-conformity intolerable, ultimately the decision to 
reject was made in light of the fact that a non-conformity actually existed.  
Further, particularly in the context of sophisticated parties, around which 
the majority of this discussion revolves, it is commercially reasonable for a 
party to consider the value for the goods when deciding whether to enforce 
his right of rejection to the fullest and, indeed, it is generally commercially 
reasonable for him to insist on the full benefit of his bargain by rejecting 
under those circumstances. 
Part IV also argues that, in addition to being unhelpful for the ultimate 
resolution of contracts cases, permitting evidence of falling markets offers 
little more than an alternate holding to the main holding in perfect tender 
cases and, as such, detracts from the development of an efficient and 
predictable law of contracts.  Worse still, this uncertainty encourages 
litigation by lending support to sellers in future cases who tender non-
conforming goods in a falling market, only to cry foul when those goods 
are rightly rejected.  This in turn may have the perverse effect of denying 
buyers the full benefit of the contracts they bargained for.  Finally, Part V 
concludes by testing the framework advocated in the Note against the facts 
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found in previous judicial decisions. 
II.  THE ACADEMIC BACKDROP 
A.  The Perfect Tender Rule 
U.C.C. section 2-601 provides that in the case of one-shot contracts, 
buyers may reject the whole “if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in 
any respect to conform to the contract . . . .”2  The buyer in turn has a 
corresponding duty “to accept and pay in accordance with the contract.”3  
Courts have agreed that section 2-601 reflects a statutory revival of the 
perfect tender rule.4  The purpose of the perfect tender rule, according to 
Professor Corbin, is “to secure high performance standards” because 
without the fear of a buyer’s ability to reject goods, sellers “would be 
tempted to saddle buyers with unsuitable and defective goods.”5  Professor 
Miniter provided a popular example of the unfairness that could result if 
substantial performance were allowed instead of perfect tender: 
A seller might find that it is significantly cheaper to make the 
machinery capable of operation within a seven percent 
deviation than to make it operate within only a five percent 
deviation as required by the contract.  He would be gambling 
that the buyer could not make out a case for substantial 
impairment independent of the contract and that any damages 
that the buyer might prove would be less than his cost 
savings in producing the inferior machine.6 
The possibility of sub-par performance is considered to be more likely to 
occur in the performance of one-shot contracts, where the absence of a 
continuous commercial relationship gives the buyer less leverage as to 
slightly non-conforming goods.  For this reason, only one-shot contracts 
are subject to the perfect tender rule, while installment contracts are subject 
to a “substantial performance” requirement.7 
                                                                                                                          
2 U.C.C. § 2-601 (2002).  Proper rejection entails not only a simple refusal to accept the goods, 
but also notification to the buyer.  If goods are not accepted when they should be, the refusal is said to 
be “wrongful.”  See U.C.C. § 2-703 (2002).  If goods could have been rejected, but notice was 
improperly given, then the rejection is said to be ineffective.  See 67 AM. JUR. 2D Sales § 592 (2003). 
3 U.C.C. § 2-301 (2002). 
4 See, e.g., Ramirez v. Autosport, 440 A.2d 1345, 1349 (N.J. 1982) (“To the extent that a buyer 
can reject goods for any nonconformity, the UCC retains the perfect tender rule.”). 
5 8 CATHERINE M.A. MCCAULIFF, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, CONDITIONS § 33.3 (Joseph M. 
Perillo ed., 1999). 
6 Francis A. Miniter, Buyer’s Right of Rejection, 13 GA. L. REV. 805, 826 (1979).  Miniter’s 
hypothetical is based on the facts of Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 269 N.E.2d 664, 666, 668–
69 (Mass. 1971). 
7 Installment contracts are dealt with in U.C.C. § 2-612 (2002).  The remainder of this Note 
discusses only single transaction contracts.  For a useful commentary on installment contracts, see 
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Almost immediately after the first draft of the U.C.C. was approved, 
commentators challenged the strength of its conception of the rule.  For 
instance, White and Summers are “skeptical of the real importance of the 
perfect tender rule,” and argue that the law would be “little changed” if 
courts required a substantial non-conformity for rejection.8  Then-Professor 
Ellen Peters called the U.C.C.’s perfect tender rule “a mere shadow of its 
formerly robust self.”9  Among the many statutory limitations on a buyer’s 
right to insist on perfection are the fact that goods need not actually be 
perfect, but rather only need to conform precisely to the terms of the 
contract (subject to trade usage, course of performance, and course of 
dealing), the seller’s right to cure, and—perhaps most significantly—the 
obligation of good faith.10  Courts, however, have not been nearly as eager 
to declare the perfect tender rule lifeless, and as Professor William 
Lawrence has argued, “commentators have greatly exaggerated the extent 
to which the limitations in Article 2 undercut the application of the perfect 
tender rule.”11  Nevertheless, a brief sketch of the relevant limitations on 
the buyer’s otherwise formidable right to reject goods is appropriate. 
1.  Distinguishing Between Conforming and Non-Conforming Goods 
a.  The Perfection Misnomer 
Professor Williston points out that the perfect tender rule “is somewhat 
of a misnomer” because the goods do not have to be literally perfect, but 
must merely conform to the terms of the contract.12  The terms of the 
contract include both written specifications and supplemental terms that 
are inferred from trade usage, course of dealing, and course of 
performance.  The more specificity that the parties choose to use in the 
language of their contract, the less they will have to supplement the 
understanding of what was to be tendered against more ambiguous 
concepts such as trade usage.  This is a simple point yet it is often 
overlooked.  In essence, parties control their own destiny with respect to 
the level of perfection required.  Parties should be able to bargain for all 
                                                                                                                          
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 302–05 (West Publishing Co., 
4th ed. 1995). 
8 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 300–01. 
9 Ellen A. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 206 (1963). 
10 Other asserted limits on the perfect tender rule include the fact that installment contracts are 
dealt with in an entirely different section, section 2-504, which provides that an improper shipment 
contract that causes a late delivery is grounds for rejection only if “material delay or loss ensues.”  
U.C.C. § 2-504 (2002).  Finally, courts may manipulate otherwise acceptable revocations for minor 
defects under the guise of some other procedural device such as failure to make a proper rejection.  See 
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 301. 
11 William H. Lawrence, The Prematurely Reported Demise of the Perfect Tender Rule, 35 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 557, 558 (1987). 
12 14 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 40:6 (4th ed. 2000). 
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that they want in a transaction.  If their negotiations are successful, then 
courts should have no qualms holding sellers to produce exactly what they 
promise.  Parties that choose to be less descript in the terms they use to 
reflect that which is to be tendered may find negotiations go smoother; 
however, this approach leaves more latitude to determine what is and what 
is not reasonably implied within the definition that the parties did select 
after the fact. 
b.  Commercial Practices Help Define What Has to Be Tendered 
Often commercial practices play a significant role in defining the 
required specifications of a particular good.  White and Summers refer to 
these factors as “[a]dditional restrictions” on the perfect tender rule.13  In 
fact, it is more helpful to think of them merely as establishing the terms of 
the contract in cases where the parties did not exercise enough clarity 
through their own writings.  In other words, these concepts do not change 
the perfect tender rule, they merely shape the requirements of the contract 
in a way that makes what at first appeared to be a breach actually turn out 
to be conforming tender.14  An example is when a contract specifies 
delivery of twelve items, but industry custom is that twelve means 
anywhere between eleven and thirteen.  Under these facts, a delivery of 
eleven would not invoke the perfect tender rule—not because of an 
“exception” to the rule, but rather because eleven is a conforming tender in 
this industry.  Prior commercial practices can be disclaimed, but this 
requires clarity and specificity.15 
c.  The Debate over “Trivial Defects” 
Many commentators have suggested that buyers should not be able to 
reject goods for “insignificant” or “trivial” defects.  For example, Professor 
Robert Summers claims that “a buyer who openly seizes upon trivial 
defects to justify his rejection . . . admitting all along that he is rejecting the 
goods because the price has gone down . . . is certainly [acting in] 
commercial bad faith.”16  Courts, on the other hand, have shown a 
willingness to enforce the perfect tender rule more vigorously and allow 
                                                                                                                          
13 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 300–01. 
14 See John A. Sebert, Jr., Rejection, Revocation, and Cure Under Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 375, 386–87 (1990). 
15 See U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (2002) (commercial practices become an element of the meaning of 
the words used “[u]nless carefully negated”). 
16 Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 205–06 (1968); see also Lawrence, supra note 11, at 
570 (“Many commentators have praised section 2-508(2) as a desirable provision designed to prevent 
buyers from rejecting goods with trivial nonconformities in order to escape bargains that become 
unfavorable because the market for the goods falls.”).  But see HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 11:11 (2008) (“Technically, any failure, however small, is a nonconformity that justifies 
rejection under § 2-601.”). 
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buyers to reject even for minor or trivial defects.  For instance, in DeJesus 
v. CAT Auto Tech Corp., a New York court rejected White and Summer’s 
view that substantial performance should be the standard, stating that 
“New York has not adopted this view, and continues to subscribe to the 
perfect tender rule,” which the court described as requiring “exact 
performance.”17  Likewise, in KCA Electronics, Inc. v. Legacy Electronics, 
Inc., a California appellate court ruled that “the perfect tender rule imposes 
‘a very high level of conformity’ to the contract on sellers, allowing buyers 
to ‘reject a seller’s tender for any trivial defect, whether it be in the quality 
of the goods, the timing of the performance, or the manner of delivery.’”18 
Some commentators argue these statements are dicta, since the defects 
in many of the cases containing such language are arguably not 
insignificant.19  While this may be true in some cases, there remains ample 
authority in many jurisdictions to support a buyer’s absolute right of 
rejection as a rule of law.  For instance, in DeJesus, the buyer had ordered 
gift certificates to be distributed to its employees.  The court upheld the 
buyer’s rejection due to the fact that “the paper was different, and the 
chosen sample contained a decorative border, whereas the finished product 
did not.”20  And in KCA Electronics, which involved the delivery of 
canopies designed to allow for the stacking of computer chips, the court 
held that six percent of the delivered parts lacking uniform features was 
sufficient to allow the buyer to reject the whole.21 
Courts seem particularly likely to allow rejection based on minor non-
conformities in cases where the defect goes to a term expressly agreed to 
by the parties, or where it is clearly important to the buyer.  In Texas 
Imports v. Allday, the parties contracted for the sale of forty-nine cattle.22  
The court ruled that ten of the cattle being unsound provided sufficient 
basis to permit the buyer to reject all of them.23  This was true in spite of 
the fact that there was no indication in the record that the buyer had been 
harmed by the tender of ten less sound animals than originally contracted 
for, as well as circumstantial evidence indicating that the buyer had 
                                                                                                                          
17 DeJesus v. CAT Auto Tech Corp., 615 N.Y.S.2d 236, 238 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1994); see also Y&N 
Furniture Inc. v. Nwabuoku, 734 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2001) (“The buyer’s right, 
generally, to reject the goods for any nonconformity, even one that is trivial, is known as the ‘perfect 
tender rule []’ . . . .”). 
18 KCA Elecs., Inc. v. Legacy Elecs., Inc., No. G037285, 2007 WL 2137959, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
July 26, 2007). 
19 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 301–02 n.6; see also Sebert, supra note 14, at 384–85. 
20 DeJesus, 615 N.Y.S.2d. at 237.  The court also noted that two of the eight certificates had 
colors immediately outside the borders but that one was “slightly noticeable” and the other “noticeable 
only upon close inspection.”  Id. 
21 KCA Elecs., 2007 WL 2137959, at *2. 
22 Tex. Imports v. Allday, 649 S.W.2d 730, 732–33 (Tex. App. 1983). 
23 Id. at 738. 
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overbought.24  In another case, a car buyer was permitted to reject tender of 
a car that did not have a spare tire.25  In that case, the court noted that the 
buyer was a traveling salesman who traveled extensively in his trade and 
the spare tire was important to him for safety reasons.26 
Part of the problem fueling the disagreement between courts and 
commentators may be a matter of mere terminology.  Buzz words such as 
“insignificant” or “trivial” do little to advance the analysis of a defect.  A 
close reading of the case law confirms that a particular defect that is trivial 
can make goods non-conforming, or may be inadequate to make them non-
conforming, depending on a close analysis of what was actually contracted 
for.  A defect may be small (and thus “trivial” under lay usage), yet if it 
goes to an important component of the good, such as the spare tire to the 
traveling salesmen, then it should render that good non-conforming.  
Another small (trivial) defect that does not affect an important component 
of the tendered good does not make the good non-conforming.  This is not 
because there is some sort of de minimus exception for trivial defects, but 
rather, because such a defect does not impinge on the bargain the parties 
struck, and therefore does not make the item legally non-conforming.27  
For the duration of this Note, any defect—small, nitpicky, and, yes, even 
trivial—which goes to the contractually required specifications and thus, if 
unsatisfied, would permit a buyer to reject will be referred to as “legally 
significant.”  Any non-conformity that is insufficient to trigger a right of 
rejection—again, not because of the small size of the defect, but because it 
does not affect what was agreed to be delivered in any meaningful way—
will be referred to as “legally insignificant.” 
2.  Seller’s Right to Cure 
Section 2-508 of the U.C.C. gives sellers a limited right to cure non-
conformities in the goods they tender, thereby maintaining the buyer’s 
obligation to accept pursuant to the terms of the contract.28  This has been 
called one of the “most significant new intrusion[s] on the perfect tender 
rule”; however, there remain “substantial uncertainties” about how to apply 
it.29  Many commentators talk of the right to cure as though it represents a 
                                                                                                                          
24 For example, the buyer did not exercise his right to reject all the cattle, nor did he limit his 
rejection to the ten non-conforming cattle.  Instead, he accepted twenty-seven and rejected twenty-two.  
See id. at 738; see also Sebert, supra note 14, at 385–86 (discussing the buyer’s probable motive in 
Texas Imports). 
25 Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. Miller, 362 N.W.2d 704, 705 (Mich. 1984). 
26 Id. at 706–07. 
27 An example of this can be seen in Fanok v. Carver Boat Corp., where the buyer of a yacht tried 
to reject for scratches on the kitchen table, dirt on the carpet, and master bath shower doors that “rattle 
a lot when underway.”  576 F. Supp. 2d 404, 418 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).  This attempted rejection was made 
only after the entire yacht had been destroyed by an unexplained fire.  Id.  Not surprisingly, the court 
found the alleged defects insufficient under these facts.  Id. at 406. 
28 See U.C.C. § 2-508 (2002). 
29 Sebert, supra note 14, at 389. 
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drastic limit on the perfect tender rule.  But Professor Lawrence argues that 
these statements exaggerate the practical effect of the cure provision.30  
First, section 2-508(1) only allows a seller to cure defects if it can do so 
“within the contract time.”31  Therefore, practically speaking, this section is 
applicable only when the seller tenders goods early.  As such, Professor 
Lawrence argues that it is “not particularly remarkable in light of prior law 
and business practices.”32  The more significant right to cure is found under 
section 2-508(2), which provides sellers additional reasonable time to cure 
if they “had reasonable grounds to believe” that their initial non-
conforming tender would be acceptable.33  The comment suggests that the 
drafters intended for this to be a narrow exception.34  Professor Robert 
Nordstrom has argued that this subsection was only intended to protect 
sellers who knew of the defect in their goods, but nonetheless had reason to 
believe that the goods would still be accepted by the buyer.35  At least one 
court has rejected this view, and other commentators—including White 
and Summers—have advocated for broader applicability of section 2-
508(2).36  However, whatever standard is used to invoke section 2-508(2), 
once it is successfully invoked, the access to additional time is limited, and 
as such makes it a difficult provision for sellers to rely on.37  Finally, and 
perhaps most significantly, under either subsection of 2-508, if a seller is 
unable (or unwilling) to cure the defect, then the buyer’s rejection stands as 
valid.38  In other words, the buyer either gets its perfect tender or it gets to 
reject; in this sense the right to cure is hardly a limit on the effectiveness of 
                                                                                                                          
30 See Lawrence, supra note 11, at 568. 
31 U.C.C. § 2-508(1). 
32 Lawrence, supra note 11, at 563. 
33 U.C.C. § 2-508(2). 
34 “Such reasonable grounds can lie in prior course of dealing, course of performance or usage of 
trade as well as in the particular circumstances surrounding the making of the contract.”  U.C.C. § 2-
508 cmt. 2; see also Lawrence, supra note 11, at 564 (arguing that although the comment does not 
purport to provide an exhaustive list of things that would form the basis for a party to reasonably 
believe his non-conforming goods would be accepted, it “tends to suggest a narrow range of 
appropriate criteria”). 
35 ROBERT J. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 321 (West Publishing Co. 1970). 
36 See Joc Oil USA, Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 434 N.Y.S.2d 623, 632 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).  
White and Summers think that this remedy should be available if a seller can show (1) that he was 
ignorant of the defect despite his good faith and prudent business behavior or (2) he had some reason to 
believe that the goods would be acceptable.  WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 324.  In contrast, 
Professor Hawkland focuses on the size of the initial defect, reasoning that a seller should be able to 
invoke section 2-508(2) if “he can do so without subjecting the buyer to any great inconvenience, risk 
or loss.”  William D. Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels, 46 MINN. L. REV. 
697, 724 (1962).  See generally Michael A. Schmitt & David Frisch, The Perfect Tender Rule—An 
“Acceptable” Interpretation, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 1375 (1982) (surveying various attempts to reconcile 
the perfect tender rule with the cure provisions). 
37 See White & Summers, supra note 7, at 322 (stating that cure can only be made within a 
“reasonable” period of time). 
38 See Lawrence, supra note 11, at 567–68 (“The buyer’s right to exact seller performance under 
the sales contract is not diminished by the right to cure, except for an extension of time [under § 2-
508(2)].”). 
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rejection from the buyer’s perspective. 
3.  Right to Reject Must Be Exercised in Good Faith 
All aspects of the performance of a contract must be performed in 
“good faith.”39  Since the rejection of goods is an aspect of performance, 
rejection—even if otherwise rightful—must be performed in good faith.40  
Professor Lawrence believes that of all the so-called “exceptions” to the 
perfect tender rule, the good faith requirement is the most important (and, 
from his perspective, the most underutilized).41  Before examining why 
Professor Lawrence feels this way, it is important to provide some general 
background on the concept of good faith. 
B.  The Duty of Good Faith in Performance 
The general obligation of good faith in the performance of contracts is 
a relatively new concept.42  Section 1-304 of the U.C.C. provides that 
“[e]very contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code] imposes 
an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.”43  Under 
the current Article I, good faith is defined as “honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”44  The 
duty of good faith in performance has been hailed as “possibly the single 
most significant doctrinal development in American contract law over the 
past fifty years.”45  A full review of the academic literature on the general 
obligation of good faith in performance under American contract law is 
beyond the scope of this Note, although ample literature does exist.46  
                                                                                                                          
39 U.C.C. § 1-304 (2008). 
40 See Lawrence, supra note 11, at 571 (“Invoking the right to reject avoids [a buyer’s] 
responsibilities and thus can be exercised legitimately only when it is done in good faith.”); see also 
Linda J. Rusch, Qualifications on Perfect Tender Rule, in 2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-601:3 (2009) (“[T]here is no doubt that the buyer is under an 
obligation to act in good faith when he rejects . . . .”). 
41 Lawrence, supra note 11, at 571. 
42 See Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract Interpretation and Gap-
Filling, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 559, 571 (2006). 
43 U.C.C. § 1-304. 
44 Id. § 1-201(20) (2008).  Under the U.C.C.’s prior Article I, “good faith” was generally defined 
to mean only “honesty”; however, Article II has always required merchants to conform with reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.  See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19) (2000), 2-103(1)(b) (2002). 
45 Sebert, supra note 14, at 383; see also Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—
Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 810 (1982). 
46 See generally Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 
299 (1988); Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good 
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980) [hereinafter Burton, Good Faith I]; Steven J. Burton, Good Faith 
Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1 
(1982) [hereinafter Burton, Good Faith II]; Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a 
Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1984) [hereinafter Burton, Good Faith 
III]; Steven J. Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2 of the U.C.C., 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1533 
(1994) [hereinafter Burton, Good Faith IV]; Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards 
for Evaluating When the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated, 47 HASTINGS 
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Instead, this Note provides a brief overview of a few aspects of the debate 
which are most pertinent to answering the questions posed in Part I. 
1.  Defining Good Faith 
The most logical place to begin deciphering the term good faith is to 
look to the intent of the original U.C.C. drafters.  In an early draft of the 
U.C.C., the drafters defined good faith to include both honesty and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards.  A proposed comment 
would have explained the standard as requiring the observance of 
“commercial decencies.”47  By the time the first version of the U.C.C. was 
approved, the definition had been pared down to just “honesty” and the 
reference to commercial decencies had been abandoned.48  Professor 
Clayton Gillette points out that even without this language, the term 
“honesty” itself is susceptible to a host of meanings ranging from a very 
narrow view of honesty in its literal sense, to more liberal conceptions of 
the term which might themselves include forms of improper commercial 
behavior deemed dishonest in spirit.49  A contrary version of the original 
drafting suggests that the commercial standards language was removed at 
the bequest of practitioners specifically because it was viewed as an 
“unnecessarily broad, moralistic imperative.”50  Even if the original 
drafting had produced a clear “intent of the drafters,” the inquiry would 
still be incomplete.  This is true both because (as discussed above) the most 
recent version of the U.C.C. does restore the element of “reasonable 
commercial standards” to all parties, and because, regardless of what the 
U.C.C.’s drafters believed, it was the individual state legislatures that 
ratified the U.C.C. and therefore their intent that really matters.51 
In his seminal piece on good faith, Professor Robert Summers argues 
that a definition of good faith cannot be verbally conceptualized in any 
meaningful way, but rather can be understood only as an “excluder” that 
                                                                                                                          
L.J. 585 (1996); Dubroff, supra note 42; E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and 
Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666 (1963); 
Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619 (1981); Seth 
William Goren, Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places: Problems in Applying the Implied Covenant 
of Good Faith Performance, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 257 (2003); Howard O. Hunter, The Growing 
Uncertainty About Good Faith in American Contract Law, 20 J. CONT. L. 31 (2004); Christina L. 
Kunz, Frontispiece on Good Faith: A Functional Approach Within the UCC, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1105 (1990); Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on 
Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503 (1991); Summers, Good Faith, supra note 16; Summers, 
Recognition and Conceptualization, supra note 45; Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party 
Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223 (1999). 
47 Gillette, supra note 46, at 623 (citing U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. (May 1949 Draft)). 
48 However, as discussed, supra note 44, Article II has always required merchants to conform 
with reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. 
49 Gillette, supra note 46, at 621–22. 
50 Id. at 624. 
51 Id. at 626. 
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excludes a litany of identifiable instances of bad faith.52  Professor 
Summers believes that this is the only conception that can provide the 
adequate degree of malleability for courts to “do justice.”53  According to 
Professor Summers, courts should condemn certain types of action as bad 
faith “even when the objectionable conduct is within the letter of the 
contract . . . .”54  Professor Summers was concerned that judges were 
distorting more definite areas of contractual jurisprudence in order to reach 
the just result in difficult cases.  This, he argued, created fictions that 
undermined legal principles and subverted predictability.  Instead, he 
advocated giving courts a flexible doctrine that they could apply at their 
own discretion and thus leave other contractual doctrines undisturbed.55 
In an influential series of articles, Professor Steven Burton faulted 
Summers’s conception for being too nebulous.56  Instead, he proposed a 
more concrete model.  Professor Burton believes that whenever a party is 
entrusted with discretion in contract performance that affects the other 
party’s benefit, such discretion cannot be exercised to recapture 
opportunities that were foregone by entering into the contract.57  This, 
Burton argues, would be bad faith.  Any exercise of discretion to recapture 
opportunities which were not foregone as a result of the contract can be 
considered good faith.58  This necessarily requires courts to determine the 
intent a party had when undertaking a given course of action because the 
same exact type of conduct could be deemed good faith or bad faith, based 
on the court’s findings as to why the party behaved the way it did.59  
Though conceding that there are “well-known difficulties” in determining 
subjective intent, Burton advocated a subjective inquiry until his most 
recent article in which he candidly changes course and advocates for an 
objective inquiry into what caused the buyer’s conduct.60 
Not everyone agrees with such sweeping definitions of good faith as 
Summers, Burton, and others have advocated.  Professor Gillette argues 
that good faith should be little more than an “ancillary exhortative or 
                                                                                                                          
52 Summers, Good Faith, supra note 16, at 196. 
53 Id. at 198. 
54 Id. at 239. 
55 See id. at 198. 
56 See Burton, Good Faith I, supra note 46, at 369–70 & n.5; Burton, Good Faith II, supra note 
45, at 1–3; Burton, Good Faith III, supra note 46, at 497; Burton, Good Faith IV, supra note 46, at 
1535–36.  Professor Summers in turn has faulted Professor Burton’s conception for providing little 
substance to the analysis.  See Summers, Recognition and Conceptualization, supra note 46, at 810. 
57 Burton, Good Faith I, supra note 46, at 372–73. 
58 Id. at 373. 
59 See Burton, Good Faith III, supra note 46, at 502–03 (stating that an “act” taken by a party can 
be “legally neutral” when deciding whether there was a breach and that, in order to make such a 
determination, the court must determine “whether the discretion-exercising party used its discretion for 
an improper purpose”). 
60 See Burton, Good Faith IV, supra note 46, at 1562 n.131. 
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precatory function that carries no legal sanctions.”61  These views mark a 
significant and—with courts weighing in on both sides—unresolved debate 
over whether it can ever be bad faith to exercise an option that is provided 
by the written terms of the contract.  This debate can roughly be broken 
into two camps: the contextualist view and the neoformalist view.62  
a.  The Contextualist View 
Proponents of the contextualist view believe that good faith should 
have independent substantive content.63  This view tries to encourage a 
cooperative relationship between the parties in which both sides make 
efforts to protect the reasonable expectations of the others.  Professor 
Summers’s view fits within this group.  Summers believes that good faith 
should prevent parties from declaring technical breaches.64  In other words, 
even if they technically had the right to declare a breach, parties should 
forgo that right in certain circumstances out of consideration for the other 
party. 
A district court, applying Utah law, articulated an expansive duty that 
went beyond the express terms of the agreement.  Citing a Utah Supreme 
Court decision, the court stated: 
An examination of express contract terms alone is 
insufficient to determine whether there has been a breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  To 
comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good 
faith, a party’s actions must be consistent with the agreed 
common purpose and the justified expectations of the other 
party.  The purpose, intentions, and expectations of the 
parties should be determined by considering the contract 
language and the course of dealings between and conduct of 
the parties.65 
Although the court found that the duty of good faith had not been breached 
in this case, its statement that the “express contract terms alone is 
insufficient”66 demonstrates a contextualist view of striving to honor the 
spirit of the agreement even if it is contrary to the actual language used to 
                                                                                                                          
61 Gillette, supra note 46, at 665. 
62 HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 8:8 (2009). 
63 Id. 
64 See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 16, at 234–35; see also Gillette, supra note 46, at 619–20 
(“[Summers] proposes that good faith be defined to require commercial actors to forbear from 
declaring technical breaches.”). 
65 A.I. Trans. v. Imperial Premium Fin., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 345, 348 (D. Utah 1994) (citing St. 
Benedict’s Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict’s Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991)). 
66 Id. 
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express it.67 
b.  The Neoformalist View 
Proponents of the neoformalist view argue that good faith is meant 
only to exclude bad faith and fill gaps, and should not impose affirmative 
requirements beyond the terms of the agreement.  As Professor Dubroff 
posits, “How can a party be said to be performing or enforcing in bad faith 
when it does no more or less than what was expressly agreed to and 
understood by the parties?”68  Neoformalists value respecting the allocation 
of risks which the parties themselves bargained for.  Professor Dubroff 
suggests that expansive good faith conceptions are “unprincipled and may 
lead to erroneous results in determining rights under the contract.”69 
In addition to concerns about respecting the private parties’ bargain, 
there is another more public goal of encouraging the development of a 
body of commercial law which is clear and predictable.  Professor Gillette 
argues that judicial usage of good faith language “indicates lack of 
precision in the court’s reasoning and detracts from the judicial 
development and comprehension of the [Uniform Commercial] Code.”70  
He argues that it has also contributed to uncertainty in commercial contract 
disputes.  Professor Dubroff agrees that these expansive good faith 
conceptions “create an environment for deciding cases that may be 
unnecessarily vague and rootless” and their application “can be a confusing 
and unsatisfying business.”71 
The Seventh Circuit issued an opinion that closely expresses a 
neoformalist viewpoint.72  In that case, which involved a commercial bank 
enforcing a particularly harsh contract clause at an unexpected and 
inopportune time for the borrower, Judge Easterbrook wrote: 
Firms that have negotiated contracts are entitled to enforce 
them to the letter, even to the great discomfort of their trading 
partners, without being mulcted for lack of “good faith”.  
Although courts often refer to the obligation of good faith 
that exists in every contractual relation, this is not an 
invitation to the court to decide whether one party ought to 
                                                                                                                          
67 Another example of this type of reasoning can be seen in Baker v. Ratzlaff, where the court 
found a seller to be in breach of the good faith obligation because he declared the buyer in breach 
“upon a technical pretense.”  564 P.2d 153, 156 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977).  Although the terms of their 
agreement gave the seller the right to declare a breach for the buyer’s non-payment of previous loads, 
the court was moved by evidence that the market for goods rose sharply and the seller had resold the 
goods to another party at a higher price.  Id. at 156–57. 
68 Dubroff, supra note 42, at 602. 
69 Id. at 597. 
70 Gillette, supra note 46, at 630. 
71 Dubroff, supra note 42, at 584, 587. 
72 Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
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have exercised privileges expressly reserved in the document.  
“Good faith” is a compact reference to an implied 
undertaking not to take opportunistic advantage in a way that 
could not have been contemplated at the time of drafting, and 
which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the parties.73 
According to Judge Easterbrook, since the parties had addressed the 
disputed conduct in their contract (by agreeing that the bank possessed 
such a right), the issue fell beyond the scope of good faith.74 
2.  Good Faith as an Excluder 
In spite of the ongoing debate over whether good faith itself has any 
independent substance, courts have generally agreed that at the very least, 
good faith requires the absence of bad faith.  This view is based on 
Professor Summers’s “excluder” definition, and results from that fact that 
acts performed in bad faith are not allowed under contracts governed by 
the U.C.C.75  Then-Judge Scalia took this view in a D.C. Court of Appeals 
case in which he stated: 
We agree with the observation of Professor Summers that the 
concept of good faith in the performance of contracts is an 
“excluder.”  It is a phrase without general meaning (or 
meanings) of its own and serves to exclude a wide range of 
heterogeneous forms of bad faith.  In a particular context the 
phrase takes on specific meaning, but usually this is only by 
way of contrast with the specific form of bad faith actually or 
hypothetically ruled out.76 
Judge Scalia added that “even the permissible act performed in bad faith is 
a breach only because acts in bad faith are not permitted under the 
contract.”77  
The remainder of this Note focuses solely on the excluder issue in the 
falling market context.  In other words, this Note examines whether 
rejection of goods with a minor defect in a falling market should be 
considered bad faith, and thus disallowed under either the contextualist or 
the neoformalist model.  To perform this search for bad faith, we will put 
aside the academic formulations of what good faith should be, and define 
bad faith more simply as excluding conduct which fails to satisfy the 
                                                                                                                          
73 Id. at 1357 (internal citations omitted). 
74 Id.; see also Wells Fargo Bank v. Citizens Bank of Tex., 181 S.W.3d 790, 804 (Tex. App. 
2005) (“Nor can a bank be said to violate its ‘obligation of good faith’ under [former U.C.C. § 1-203] if 
it acts in accordance with the requirements of the U.C.C.”). 
75 This is true because regardless of what good faith does mean, it certainly does not mean bad 
faith. 
76 Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
77 Id. at 1150 n.3. 
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U.C.C.’s requirement of “honesty” and conformity with “reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing.”78  The honesty requirement has been 
interpreted as a subjective standard.79  For instance, in the context of 
buyers exercising their right to reject goods, they must do so out of actual 
dissatisfaction with the tender.  By contrast, “commercially reasonable 
standards of fair dealing in trade” is meant to be an objective measure of 
conformity based on trade usage, course of dealing, and course of 
performance.80  This inquiry takes into account the reasonable business 
norms in a given context.  For example, in Hubbard v. UTZ Quality Foods, 
the court held that a commercial buyer of potatoes, which the contract 
required to be within a certain color range, did not reject in bad faith when 
he failed to measure the potatoes’ color with a machine before rejecting on 
the basis of poor color because, even though the machine would have been 
much more accurate, it was reasonable within the potato industry to use 
visual inspections.81 
C.  Good Faith in Perfect Tender Cases 
Having sketched a brief overview of good faith, one can proceed to 
examine how it should be applied in perfect tender cases.  Professor 
Lawrence states that good faith “is the most important provision to ensure 
that the perfect tender rule is applied as a just standard.”82  Although he 
was generally a strong proponent of perfect tender (as opposed to the 
substantial performance standard advocated by many scholars), he 
nonetheless argued that good faith should act as an important restraint on 
the rule.  Specifically, Professor Lawrence argues that “[a] buyer’s 
insistence upon rejection for a minor contract deviation in order to avoid an 
unfavorable bargain is an unfair use of buyers’ rejection rights that can be 
attacked best through utilization of the good faith obligation of the 
buyer.”83  Lawrence believes that a buyer whose true subjective reason for 
rejection is to escape a bad bargain is acting in bad faith because their 
conduct fails the honesty requirement of good faith.84 
Other commentators have concurred that good faith should preclude 
rejection in order to escape from a bad bargain, however, unlike Professor 
Lawrence they do not believe it would be “dishonest” for a buyer to 
behave this way.  For instance, Summers believes that it should be bad 
faith for a buyer to reject for a pre-textual reason, however, he argues 
                                                                                                                          
78 See U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2008). 
79 Burton, Good Faith IV, supra note 46, at 1539; see also Schmitt & Frisch, supra note 36, at 
1397 (“The good faith required of a consumer purchaser is mere honesty in fact—a subjective test.”). 
80 Burton, Good Faith IV, supra note 46, at 1539. 
81 Hubbard v. UTZ Quality Foods, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 444, 445–51 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).  
82 Lawrence, supra note 11, at 558. 
83 Id. at 571. 
84 Id. 
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that—at least with a party who conceded his ulterior motive—“[s]ome 
judges may say that such conduct simply is not in bad faith, for it is not 
dishonest.”85  Likewise, Professor Sebert concludes: 
While I have no difficulty concluding that a merchant buyer 
who rejects because of a clearly insubstantial nonconformity 
in a falling market has failed to comply with the objective 
good faith standard . . . I am not sure that that a nonmerchant 
buyer’s attempt to use the perfect tender rule to escape a bad 
bargain is, or should be deemed, “dishonest” within the 
prohibition of the subjective standard of good faith.86 
Professor Sebert makes his conclusion based on the fact that failure to 
satisfy the perfect tender rule does in fact constitute a breach.87 
Not all commentators, however, agree that a falling market should be 
viewed as evidence of a bad faith rejection on the basis of a minor non-
conformity.  Professor Gillette argues that since the buyer has caused 
neither the non-conformity nor the falling market he should have no 
obligation to abstain from enforcing his rights to the fullest extent.  Instead, 
he argues “that initial, trivial breach emerges from materialization of a risk 
which the seller assumed, presumably because he believed he was in a 
superior position to control the occurrence of the risk.”88  Professor Gillette 
believes the effects of this would force contract parties into “forbearance 
from self-interested action that conflicts with the interests of other 
parties.”89 
In addition, Professor Gillette believes this approach is more faithful to 
the bargain the parties negotiated and, as such, provides clearer standards 
of contractual interpretation for future disputes.  While critics have 
contended that buyers assume the risk of a falling market and, thus, their 
rejection in this circumstance deprives the seller of the expected benefits of 
the contract, Professor Gillette points out that it is equally true that the 
seller has assumed the risk of failing to make conforming tender.90  
Professor Gillette argues that “[m]aterialization of that risk should not be 
avoided any more readily than materialization of the risk of market 
decline.”91  Since there is no way that both parties will still receive the 
expected value of their bargain in a falling market, it seems unclear why 
the buyer should be held accountable for the occurrence of a risk he did not 
control, while the seller is not held accountable for the occurrence of a risk 
                                                                                                                          
85 Summers, Good Faith, supra note 16, at 249–50. 
86 Sebert, supra note 14, at 387. 
87 See id. at 387 & n.77. 
88 Gillette, supra note 46, at 641. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 655. 
91 Id. 
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that he and he alone controlled.  If the seller had feared his ability to 
deliver goods of a certain quality or within a certain specified time, he 
could have struck his bargain differently. 
Finally, Professor Gillette’s argument should not be taken to excuse a 
buyer who claims a defect when none exists.  This would be a breach of 
the buyer’s obligation to accept conforming goods.92  Professor Gillette 
merely points out that it would be “pointless” to also consider the actor’s 
good or bad faith because “when courts speak of bad faith breaches, they 
impose remedies based solely on the breach that are not connected to the 
breacher’s good or bad motives.”93 
III.  JUDICIAL APPLICATION 
A current U.C.C. treatise article describes the process of judicial 
perfect tender analysis as a two part inquiry:  “(1) Do the goods conform to 
the contract? (2) If the answer to (1) is no, did the buyer reject in good 
faith?”94  As the author points out, “Since the rejection of goods is a matter 
of performance, there is no doubt that the buyer is under an obligation to 
act in good faith.”95  In practice, courts tend to agree with this basic model.  
For example, in GE Packaged Power v. Readiness Management Support,96 
Readiness Management Support (“RMS”) was accused of bad faith 
rejection of power generators built by GE.  The court denied summary 
judgment to GE citing two genuine issues of fact: “(i) whether the 
generators conformed . . . and (ii) whether RMS believed the generators to 
be nonconforming.”97  In the court’s view, ascertaining the buyer’s “belief” 
regarding the conformity of the goods was a necessary precursor to 
evaluating its’ right of rejection.98  Likewise, another court that had found 
fabric to be non-conforming nonetheless speculated that if the buyer had 
rejected for a pre-textual reason “its rejection would certainly not have 
been in good faith.”99  A number of other cases confirm these results.100 
Perhaps unavoidably, courts in these cases are forced to determine 
whether buyers who reject are truly acting honestly.  Since it is inherently 
                                                                                                                          
92 See U.C.C. § 2-301 (2002). 
93 Gillette, supra note 46, at 638. 
94 Rusch, supra note 40. 
95 Id. 
96 GE Packaged Power v. Readiness Mgmt. Support, 510 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (N.D. Ga. 2007). 
97 Id. at 1134. 
98 See id. at 1133–34 (stating that “[a] rejection of goods must be made in good faith” and “[t]o 
reject goods in bad faith, a buyer must have no good-faith belief that the goods are conforming”). 
99 Matrix Int’l Textiles, Inc. v. Jolie Intimates Inc., No. 316107/03, 2005 WL 1074774, at *6 
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. May 5, 2005). 
100 See, e.g., Clark v. Zaid, Inc., 282 A.2d 483, 484–85 n.1 (Md. 1971) (“The buyer’s judgment 
[as to rejection of goods] would have to be exercised in good faith.”); Y&N Furniture Inc. v. 
Nwabuoku, 734 N.Y.S.2d 382, 385 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2001) (“[T]he buyer’s rejection of the goods must be 
made in good faith.”). 
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difficult to know another party’s subjective motivations, courts have relied 
on circumstantial evidence out of necessity.  For instance, in Matrix 
International Textiles v. Jolie Intimates, the buyer of fabric rejected 
delivery, claiming it did not conform to the contract specifications.101  The 
seller suggested that this reason was pre-textual and that the buyer was 
simply trying to avoid delivery because it was discontinuing the operations 
of the division that would have used it.  The court noted that the buyer had 
subsequently ordered the item from another supplier at a higher price as 
circumstantial evidence that rebutted the seller’s claim.102  In another case 
challenging the rightfulness of a buyer’s rejection, the court ruled for the 
buyer after finding that the seller “has failed to convince [the court] that 
[the buyer’s] motivation for rejecting his potatoes was to obtain similar 
potatoes but at a reduced cost.”103  The court cited a lack of “compelling 
evidence” that the buyer had purchased from other suppliers at lower 
market prices after rejecting the seller’s product.104 
Several courts have suggested that evidence of falling market 
conditions prior to the buyer’s rejection may be used as circumstantial 
evidence that the buyer rejected for a dishonest purpose.  One leading case 
is Joc Oil USA v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York105  In that case, Joc 
Oil contracted to sell a large quantity of oil with a specified maximum 
sulfur content to Con Ed.  When the oil arrived it contained too much 
sulfur.  By the time Con Ed rejected delivery the time for performance had 
passed, and although Joc Oil offered to cure one day later, Con Ed declined 
this offer.  In the subsequent contract suit, Joc Oil alleged that Con Ed had 
refused to accept the replacement delivery because foreign market forces 
had caused the value of the oil to decline and that Con Ed was attempting 
to escape from a bad deal.106  The court seemed to agree, finding that 
“[t]here can be no doubt that this dispute would not exist if the market had 
risen at the time.”107  The precise issue on which the court decided the case 
was not, however, whether the rejection itself was in bad faith, but rather 
whether Joc Oil had a reasonable basis to believe that their initial delivery 
would be accepted and therefore, under U.C.C. section 2-508(2), should 
have been allotted additional time beyond the specified time of 
performance to make cure.  Concluding that “[i]t is difficult to believe that 
a construction rewarding culpability and penalizing innocence is 
                                                                                                                          
101 Matrix Int’l Textiles, 2005 WL 1074774, at *1,*3. 
102 Id. at *6. 
103 Hubbard v. UTZ Quality Foods, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 444, 450 (W.D.N.Y. 1995). 
104 Id. 
105 Joc Oil USA, Inc., v. Consol. Edison Co., 434 N.Y.S.2d 623, 630 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). 
106 See id. at 626 (noting the rise in spot oil purchase prices due to the Arab oil embargo and 
indicating that the main source of contention between the parties appeared to be the price Con Ed 
would pay for Joc Oil’s delivery). 
107 Id. at 630. 
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preferable, or consistent with the remedial intent of the creators of this 
remedy,” the court found that Joc Oil did have a reasonable basis to believe 
the oil would be accepted and therefore should have been given additional 
time for cure.108 
Although the court likely did not mean to suggest that falling market 
conditions were evidence of bad faith rejection, its disjointed discussion of 
good faith, culpability, and the underlying falling market make the opinion 
ambiguous.  Even on appeal, the New York Court of Appeals further 
obscured the issue when it opined that “the premise [for Con Ed’s 
argument] ignores the policy of the code to prevent buyers from using 
insubstantial remediable or price adjustable defects to free themselves from 
unprofitable bargains . . . .”109  At least one plaintiff’s lawyer has cited the 
case for the proposition that “[t]he Court determined that the buyer used 
the excuse of the higher sulfur content as a pretext for rejecting the 
delivery and as an attempt to escape its bad bargain.”110 
Other cases do seem to have explicitly endorsed the proposition that a 
falling market for the goods can be used as evidence of a bad faith 
motivation for rejection.  For instance, in Neumiller Farms v. Cornett,111 
Cornett and other small potato farmers in Alabama contracted to sell 
potatoes suitable for “chipping” at a price of $4.25 per hundred-weight.  
The buyer, a commercial potato broker, accepted the first several 
shipments when the market value was $4.25 per hundred-weight, but when 
the market price fell to $2.00 per hundred-weight, the buyer began 
rejecting delivery claiming that the potatoes did not chip satisfactorily.112  
Upon hearing evidence from the seller’s expert that the potatoes were 
suitable in all respects, the court ruled that the buyer had breached by 
rejecting delivery in bad faith.  The court stated that “[t]he law requires 
such a claim of dissatisfaction to be made in good faith, rather than in an 
effort to escape a bad bargain.”113  Likewise, in Printing Center of Texas v. 
Supermind Publishing, a court stated that “evidence of rejection of the 
goods on account of a minor defect in a falling market would in some 
instances be sufficient to support a finding that the buyer acted in bad faith 
when he rejected the goods.”114  Finally, in Oil Country Specialists v. 
Philipp Bros., a buyer rejected pipe that was required to meet specified 
                                                                                                                          
108 Id. at 630, 632. 
109 T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 443 N.E.2d 932, 938 n.8, 940 (N.Y. 1982). 
110 Trial Brief of Plaintiff Austrian Airlines, Austrian Airlines Oesterreichische Luftverkehrs AG 
v. UT Fin. Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3854 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008), 2008 WL 872782. 
111 Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d 272 (Ala. 1979). 
112 Id. at 274. 
113 Id. at 275; see also Baker v. Ratzlaff, 564 P.2d 153, 157 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that 
evidence of a buyer’s “hasty resale of the popcorn to another buyer at a price nearly double the contract 
price, provided the trial court with ample evidence upon which to find an absence of good faith”). 
114 Printing Ctr. of Tex., Inc. v. Supermind Publ’g Co., 669 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. App. 1984). 
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industry standards.115  When the pipe did not conform, the buyer rejected 
the entire inventory.  After hearing evidence that a falling market made the 
transaction “highly unfavorable” to the buyer, a jury concluded that the 
buyer had rejected in bad faith.116  A Texas appeals court affirmed the 
decision, finding that the buyer was entitled to reject “only if it did so in 
good faith[, t]hat is, if it did so with honesty in fact or in keeping with the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the 
trade.”117  Unfortunately, the court did not specify which of these two 
criteria the buyer had failed, instead concluding perfunctorily that the 
evidence was legally and factually sufficient.  Other cases suggest the same 
result.118 
Other courts have not been persuaded by evidence of falling market 
conditions.  One representative case is Austrian Airlines v. UT Finance.  In 
that case, Austrian Airlines agreed to sell a plane to UT Finance (“UTF”) 
in a contract which required delivery by a specific date and recited that 
time was of the essence.119  Austrian Airlines could not deliver the plane in 
perfect condition on time and UTF rejected delivery, effectively denying 
Austrian Airlines any chance to cure.  Part of Austrian Airlines’ 
subsequent contract suit argued that UTF’s rejection was made in bad faith 
because they had only done so to escape a bad bargain.  Austrian Airlines 
pointed to two facts in support of this argument.  First, UTF had not yet 
found a suitable secondary purchaser for the plane and thus there was no 
practical need for UTF to insist on timely performance.  Second, Austrian 
Airlines pointed out that the plane had been ordered prior to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, and in the wake of the resulting turmoil on the 
airline industry, the value of the plane to UTF had been reduced to two-
thirds of its expected value.120 
The court was unmoved by Austrian Airlines’ evidence, and though it 
stated that “[t]he Court assumes that UTF, quite understandably, was 
motivated by the decline in market value,” it held that this was not in bad 
faith.121  The court refused to read Joc Oil USA and similar cases as 
establishing that subjective motivations could be dispositive of the issue of 
                                                                                                                          
115 Oil Country Specialists, Ltd. v. Philipp Bros., 762 S.W.2d 170, 172–73 (Tex. App. 1988). 
116 Id. at 178. 
117 Id. 
118 For example, a New York district court opined that “[a]lthough it [is] true that the Code 
generally obligates a buyer to act in good faith in rejecting goods, plaintiff has introduced no evidence 
indicating that the defendants’ motivation in rejecting the fuel oil was a bad faith effort to escape the 
bargain.”  Warren Co. v. Olco Oil Co., No. 86-CV-660, 1988 WL 28940, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 
1988); see also Matrix Int’l Textiles, Inc. v. Jolie Intimates Inc., No. 316107/03, 2005 WL 1074774, at 
*6 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. May 5, 2005); Hubbard v. UTZ Quality Foods Inc., 903 F. Supp. 444, 451 
(W.D.N.Y. 1995). 
119 Austrian Airlines Oesterreichische Luftverkehrs AG v. UT Fin. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 2d 579, 
582–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, No. 08-4176-cv., 2009 WL 1940715 (2d Cir. July 2, 2009). 
120 Id. at 581–82, 591–93. 
121 Id. at 599–600. 
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bad faith.122  The court went on to opine that such a rule would not make 
commercial sense.123  In the court’s view, UTF’s conduct was “entirely 
reasonable” since the presence of defects was now even more significant to 
the buyer than in a normal market.124  Noting the sophistication of the 
parties, the court found “no reason not to give the buyer the benefit of its 
bargain.”125  The UTF court’s decision was affirmed on appeal by the 
Second Circuit in a brief opinion that referred to the lower court’s decision 
as “careful,” “thorough,” and “well-reasoned.”126 
Similarly, a California trial court prohibited a plaintiff from offering 
proof of an “‘ulterior motive’” by the buyer when rejecting the goods.127  
In KCA Electronics, the court focused strictly on the non-conformities 
alleged—namely, that six percent of the small computer components 
lacked the necessary uniformity—and based its decision to grant summary 
judgment in favor of the buyer strictly on the defect.128  Not only did this 
approach produce a rational and well-reasoned decision, but perhaps most 
significantly, the absence of extraneous discussions regarding why the 
seller thought the buyer had rejected the goods makes the opinion more 
precise and helpful to businessmen and lawyers who will have to litigate 
similar issues in the future. 
IV.  A NEW FRAMEWORK 
A.  Consideration of Falling Market Conditions Is Not Helpful in Deciding 
Cases 
1.  A Falling Market Does Not Impact Whether a Defect Actually 
Exists 
Nothing within the text or comments of U.C.C. section 2-601 requires 
any mental state on the part of either the buyer or the seller in order for the 
perfect tender rule to apply.129  The rule is triggered “if the goods or the 
tender of the delivery fail in any respect to conform . . . .”130  Hence, any 
review of whether a good is or is not conforming is necessarily an 
objective one.  It is only the separate good faith obligation that contains the 
                                                                                                                          
122 Specifically, the court narrowly read Joc Oil USA to apply only in the context of determining a 
seller’s reasonable basis to believe his goods would be accepted under the section 2-508(2) standard, 
and it distinguished Neumiller Farms and Printing Center of Texas.  Id. at 600. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 599. 
125 Id. at 600. 
126 See Austrian Airlines, 2009 WL 1940715, at *1–2. 
127 KCA Elecs., Inc. v. Legacy Elecs., Inc., No. G037285, 2007 WL 2137959, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 
July 26, 2007). 
128 Id. 
129 See U.C.C. § 2-601 (2002). 
130 Id. 
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requirement that the buyer reject the non-conforming tender with the right 
state of mind.  As such, inquiries into the conformity of the goods and the 
good or bad faith of the rejection are two separate inquiries.131  A falling 
market (arguably) is relevant to the latter, but not the former.  The initial 
objective determination of whether a defect is present should not be 
affected by any external factors including the economy.  If such factors are 
to be taken into account at all, it should be within the context of the actor’s 
good or bad faith.132 
Any analysis of whether a good is objectively non-conforming must 
begin with the terms of the contract.  All descriptions of the good being 
contracted for should be vigorously enforced.  In addition, courts should 
fill in the gaps by resorting to common trade usage and other established 
commercial practices for the item purchased.133  In comparing what the 
contract requires to be tendered and what was actually tendered, courts 
should avoid falling into the trap of using buzz words such as “trivial,” 
which does not aid in the analysis.  A small defect that goes to the basis of 
the bargain should be view as legally significant and should permit 
rejection.  By contrast, a defect that does not offend the basis of the bargain 
should be viewed as legally insignificant and should not permit rejection, 
even though it could be said to render the good defective under ordinary 
usage.134  In this sense, this author does not disagree with Professor 
Lawrence’s argument that buyers should not be able to reject for what he 
calls “inconsequential deviations” or defects of “no actual importance to 
the buyer.”135  This Note contends that the so-called “trivial defects” may 
be consequential depending upon the circumstances and, in such cases, 
buyers should not be restrained from acting upon those small but 
consequential defects simply because the market for the goods has fallen.  
This is consistent with the underlying goal of the perfect tender rule: to 
“create[ ] an incentive for sellers to produce goods that conform to contract 
specifications.”136 
                                                                                                                          
131 See supra Part III. 
132 See, e.g., GE Packaged Power v. Readiness Mgmt. Support, 510 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1134 (N.D. 
Ga. 2007) (denying summary judgment based on two genuine issues of fact: (i) whether the generators 
conformed . . . and (ii) whether [the buyer] believed the generators to be nonconforming”). 
133 See U.C.C. § 1-303 (2008). 
134 Compare Marlowe v. Argentine Naval Comm’n, 808 F.2d 120, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting a 
six day delay in delivering an airplane was enough to warrant rejection because time was of the 
essence), and Vitol S.A., Inc. v. Koch Petroleum Group, L.P., No. 01CV2184(GBD), 2005 WL 
2105592, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005) (“Since time was of the essence in the performance of the 
parties’ contract, defendant’s late delivery violated the perfect tender rule because defendant’s ‘tender 
of delivery fail[ed] in any respect to conform to the contract.” (alteration in the original)), with Burgess 
Steel Prods. Corp. v. Modern Telecomms., Inc., 205 A.D.2d 344, 346 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (noting 
that where plaintiff contended that time was not of the essence: “a trial is necessary to determine 
whether the deadline contained in the contract was so inflexible that the plaintiff’s late performance 
constituted a breach of a material element of the contract”). 
135 See Lawrence, supra note 11, at 572. 
136 Id. at 578. 
 2009] GOOD FAITH REJECTION OF GOODS IN A FALLING MARKET 635 
2.  If a Defect Does Exist, a Party Cannot Be Said to Be Dishonest in 
Rejecting Because of It 
Surely it would be dishonest to claim the right to reject by claiming a 
defect that does not exist.  Neumiller Farms illustrates this point.  In that 
case, Neumiller Farms rejected potatoes, claiming they did not chip 
satisfactorily, as required by the contract.  After hearing expert testimony, 
the court concluded that the potatoes were suitable for chipping and, thus, 
Neumiller Farms received exactly what it bargained for and had been 
dishonest in claiming otherwise.137 
Some commentators argue that even if there is a legally significant 
defect, a buyer must actually be rejecting because of his own subjective 
dissatisfaction with the defect rather than because of some other factor 
(such as a falling market).  Proponents of this view would suggest that 
even if the potatoes at issue in Neumiller Farms did not chip satisfactorily, 
if the court was convinced that Neumiller Farms’ true reason for rejection 
was the falling price of potatoes, then the farm would be stuck with them 
because the right to reject (although present) would have been exercised in 
bad faith. 
A better approach is to treat the honesty prong of the good faith 
obligation as a nullity in rejection cases because before the question of 
good faith even arises in this context, it must first be shown that a legally 
significant defect does in fact exist.  Thus, the honesty of the buyer’s 
assertion of a rejection should be decided in light of the initial inquiry into 
the conformity of the goods.  Once it is shown that some legally significant 
defect does in fact exist, it is inevitable that a buyer who claims the right to 
reject a good because of the presence of a defect is being honest; were it 
not for the defect, the right to reject would not and could not be claimed.  
Certainly a falling market for the goods would have influenced the 
decision that a particular defect was too much for the buyer to tolerate,138 
but this should not negate the fact that the defect was ultimately what 
triggered the rejection; the falling market merely triggered the fact that it 
was made with a light heart.  This very literal approach avoids the complex 
task of attempting to discern a party’s overriding motivation on some deep 
philosophical level.139  This approach also avoids a potentially absurd 
outcome whereby two identically situated buyers both reject non-
conforming goods, one claiming, “I am invoking the perfect tender rule 
                                                                                                                          
137 See Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d 272, 274–75 (Ala. 1979). 
138 Toleration of defects admittedly becomes much more difficult in a falling market, a point 
which is explored more in the subsection that follows. 
139 It also avoids the flawed assumption that any particular course of action can be explained by 
one principle motivational factor.  This is a questionable assumption even in the context of individual 
decision making, let alone in the context of commercial business decisions where multiple players (e.g., 
CEO, in-house counsel, sales manager) with potentially different motivations, each contribute to a 
decision to reject a particular shipment of goods. 
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because of defect [X],” and the other claiming, “I am invoking the perfect 
tender rule because the market for these goods has declined.”  If we take 
seriously the notion of honesty in this setting, then the former buyer has 
breached his contractual obligations whereas the latter has not.  There is no 
reason to think that the U.C.C. was ever intended to produce such a result 
and potentially push buyers to claim that they acted for the most insidious 
reasons imaginable simply to guard against potential liability under the 
honesty prong of the good faith obligation.140 
3.  It Is Commercially Reasonable to Expect the Full Benefit of One’s 
Original Bargain in a Falling Market 
The second prong of contractual good faith—that the parties abide by 
“commercially reasonable standards of fair dealing in trade”—is very 
context- and industry-specific.  Nonetheless, there is no reason to think that 
there cannot be some generalization across industries on some broad 
points.  Particularly with respect to large commercial parties the reasonable 
commercial standards are likely somewhat homogenous.141 
In a falling market, the value of what the buyer is receiving is already, 
by definition, reduced.  Therefore, any defects in the goods are even more 
significant to a buyer than they ordinarily would be because they 
necessarily reduce the already deflated value of the goods even further.  
Having already received the short end of the stick with respect to the 
market value of the goods, it is all the more reasonable for the buyer to 
ensure that at the very least the goods are what the contract requires them 
to be.142  On the whole, the case law shows that buyers are permitted to 
reject goods with trivial defects so long as they are legally significant.  To 
deny this right because of a falling market would have the perverse effect 
of denying this otherwise tenable course of action at a time when it is most 
reasonable for the buyer to want to exercise it. 
                                                                                                                          
140 To the extent that parties claimed such an insidious purpose, even while actually believing 
themselves to be acting for just reasons, this would produce a somewhat paradoxical result of lying in 
order to be deemed honest. 
141 To the extent that this is not true—for there are surely examples where it is not—courts should 
always elevate the specific industry practices above the more general business norms. 
142 The Austrian Airlines court stated: 
Nor would the rule for which [the seller] argues make much commercial sense.  
Where a buyer pursuant to a contract calling for future delivery is presented with 
non-conforming goods, price movements intervening between the agreement and the 
time for delivery often are taken into consideration in determining whether to reject.  
It makes sense to consider them because nonconformities often go not to the 
ultimate utility of the goods, but to their value, especially resale value.  Where the 
parties . . . contract in terms that give the buyer the right to walk away from the deal 
in the event of a non-conforming tender, there is no reason not to give the buyer the 
benefit of its bargain.  
Austrian Airlines Oesterreichische Luftverkehrs AG v. UT Fin. Corp, 567 F. Supp. 2d 579, 600 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, No. 08-4176-cv., 2009 WL 1940715 (2d Cir. July 2, 2009). 
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B.  The Argument for Categorical Exclusion 
Thus far, this Note has posited that evidence of a falling market is not 
helpful in the adjudication of disputes over rejection of goods.  One could 
fairly ask why we should categorically exclude such evidence.  After all, in 
some sense it is true that totally removing this circumstantial evidence 
from the equation could invite some buyers to use their rejection right 
strategically as a means of avoiding the contract.  Conversely, if such 
evidence is allowed in contract disputes, it is unlikely that sellers would 
have a similar strategic response; they are unlikely, after all, to 
intentionally produce goods which fail to conform to the terms of the 
contract simply because they would be armed with a factually difficult 
argument that those goods were really rejected on the basis of a falling 
market.  Given this reality, it is fair to ask, “Why not just allow evidence of 
a falling market to enter these cases for what it is worth?”  The response is 
two-fold.  First, to say that a decision to reject in a falling market is 
“strategic” is not to say that it is wrong or unjustified.143  Second, the 
inclusion of falling markets evidence in rejection cases hurts the overall 
body of contract law. 
When goods that are slightly non-conforming are tendered, a buyer is 
left with two options.  First, he can ask the seller to repair the defect.144  
The second option—assuming this is not an instance where the right to 
cure is present—the buyer can reject the goods outright and risk the dual 
possibilities of destroying his relationship with this seller and potentially 
facing litigation.  Given the apparent downsides to the second option, 
buyers are likely to think carefully before taking that course.  It is certainly 
true that the market for the goods is a factor that will play into the analysis.  
Clearly, if the value of goods had risen rather than fallen, a buyer would be 
less insistent on enforcing his rights to the fullest degree.  He would likely 
forego his right to rejection and instead permit extra time to make cure or 
negotiate a cash payment as damages for acceptance of slightly non-
conforming goods.145  However, just because the buyer has the ability not 
to enforce his rights to the fullest extent does not mean that he does not 
possess those rights in the first place.  Parties in voluntary transactions 
always have the ability to waive their rights against one another, or they 
have the ability to enforce them exactingly.  That market circumstances 
dictated which course they selected should not detract from the fact that 
they did actually possess the right to take the action they took under the 
                                                                                                                          
143 Likewise, saying that conduct was not entered into strategically by the other party does not 
mean that that the conduct was rightful under the terms of the contract. 
144 Indeed, this is sometimes, but certainly not always, required under the seller’s right to cure.  
See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
145 U.C.C. section 2-714 (2002) allows buyers to accept non-conforming goods and sue under the 
warranty for the damage caused by the non-conformity. 
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terms of the contract, that the exercise of this right was honest, and that it 
was commercially reasonable.  As Professor Gillette suggests, “That the 
buyer receives a windfall from the fortuitous breach does not necessarily 
mean that he is not entitled to it.”146 
In addition, while it may be a stretch to believe that a seller will 
actually go out of his way to strategically saddle a buyer with non-
conforming goods, the perfect tender rule is itself an acknowledgement 
that in the case of one-shot contracts, buyers need a pretty big stick in 
order to protect themselves from shoddy workmanship.  This is particularly 
true when the defects are small and, therefore, a substantial performance 
requirement would be inadequate to protect buyers’ rights.  It is consistent 
with this policy to deny the use of falling market evidence, which would 
tend to undermine the strength of the rule by giving credence to an excuse 
for lax quality standards (even if those lax quality standards were not 
undertaken strategically). 
Finally, there are other consequences of allowing sellers to introduce 
evidence that rejection was motivated by a falling market which are, on 
balance, bad for contract law. 
1.  Detracts from the Development and Clarity of U.C.C. Case Law 
Judge Learned Hand once opined that words such as “good faith . . . 
obscure the issue.”147  Indeed, cases such as Joc Oil USA, Neumiller 
Farms, and TX Printing are difficult to read because the presence of 
discussions regarding the market for the goods detracts from, and confuses, 
the discussion of the conformity of the goods.  It is difficult to tell if the 
reason for the court’s holding is the existence of a non-conformity, or the 
existence of evidence of a falling market.  If a future case arises where a 
buyer notices a non-conformity that has previously been held to be legally 
insignificant and, thus, insufficient to allow for rejection in a falling 
market, it is unclear how much weight to give such a holding if the value 
of the goods in the current case has remained steady.148  This lack of clarity 
has needlessly impaired the ability of practitioners to advise their clients as 
to when they can comfortably reject a good that they deem non-
conforming.  Professor Gillette has summarized the dilemma by saying: 
It is unclear whether the attorney can advise his client that 
cancellation of the contract with the defaulting seller is 
                                                                                                                          
146 Gillette, supra note 46, at 655. 
147 Thompson-Starrett Co. v. La Belle Iron Works, 17 F.2d 536, 541 (2d Cir. 1927).  See also 
Market St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 1991), a case in which Judge Posner quotes 
Judge Hand and agrees with his sentiment. 
148 Obviously, this type of common law problem is in no way unique to perfect tender rule cases.  
My point here is only that in perfect tender rule cases, perhaps unlike other cases, there is no need for 
courts to engage in two parallel lines of reasoning.  In this context, one discussion would suffice, and 
therefore should be deemed preferable. 
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appropriate under an expansive good faith standard.  He must 
determine whether the client will be affected adversely—
beyond the loss of a better bargain—by the nonconformity.  
Regardless of the difficulty of such a determination, the need 
to make the inquiry at all introduces into sales law the notion 
of material breach that is rejected explicitly by the host of 
provisions concerning perfect tender and cure.149 
Professor Sebert argues that the lack of cases using the duty of good faith 
as a basis for denying buyers a right to rejection may be evidence of the 
influence the doctrine is having “at the point of decision by a buyer.”150  
Such a result may well be tolerable, but it should not be preferable. 
Courts should be careful to keep discussions of conformity of the 
goods separate from discussions of the good faith of the actors, and since a 
falling market has no bearing on either, it should be left out of decisions all 
together.  If there is clear evidence that a good was conforming (as in 
Neumiller Farms), then rejection should be deemed wrongful irrespective 
of the motive of the buyer.  In such cases, courts need not, and should not, 
even reach the issue of bad faith.  If the good is found non-conforming 
then an inquiry into good faith is justified, however, since the presence or 
absence of a falling market should have no impact on this determination, it 
remains an inappropriate subject matter.  KCA Electronics is an example of 
a case that follows just this model and the holding is made much clearer 
because of it.151 
2.  Encourages Litigation at the Expense of Voluntary Settlement 
For businessmen, even a case that is won in litigation generally 
represents (at best) an unwanted annoyance.  One of the chief goals of the 
U.C.C. is to provide consistency and predictability in American contract 
law.152  This predictability is important to help guide parties’ conduct, both 
in the ordinary course of business, as well as in their decision making after 
a dispute has arisen (such as when deciding whether to sue or what 
litigation theories to utilize).153  Ideally, parties should be able to resolve 
their commercial differences without resorting to judicial intervention; 
however, realization of this goal requires a predictable outcome if they fail 
                                                                                                                          
149 Gillette, supra note 46, at 652–53. 
150 Sebert, supra note 14, at 389. 
151 KCA Elecs., Inc. v. Legacy Elecs., Inc., No. G037285, 2007 WL 2137959, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. 
July 26, 2007). 
152 See U.C.C. § 1-103 (2008) (“The [U.C.C.] must be liberally construed and applied to promote 
its underlying purposes and policies, which are: (1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law 
governing commercial transactions . . . [and] (3) to make uniform the law among the various 
jurisdictions.”). 
153 See Gillette, supra note 46, at 621 (“The Code . . . is a tool for businessmen and their attorneys 
to predict the legal consequences of voluntary transactions.”). 
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to agree.  This in turn requires “precision of definition and certainty of the 
effects of performance and nonperformance.”154  Without this certainty of 
effect, parties may be tempted to abandon the cooperative channels more 
readily in hopes of imposing a superior result upon their trading partner by 
judicial decree. 
Allowing bad faith to void an otherwise tenable right of rejection, 
encourages litigious behavior by undeserving sellers who have tendered 
non-conforming goods.  As Professor Burton has observed, the imprecise 
boundaries of good faith have produced “[j]ust enough unorthodox 
judgments . . . to inspire ever-optimistic plaintiffs’ counsel to keep the 
lawsuits coming.”155  Ambiguity breeds test cases.  Sometimes ambiguity 
is necessary or even appropriate, but in the commercial contracts context it 
often leads to inefficiency.  For instance, the extraneous discussion of good 
faith and the falling market in Joc Oil USA turned what could have been a 
straightforward U.C.C. section 508(2) case into a disjointed discussion that 
was later cited—erroneously—by a plaintiff in a multi-million dollar 
contract dispute.156  As has been explained, there is no need for the 
ambiguity posed by judicial opinions discussing falling markets in cases 
contesting the rightfulness of rejection, and, therefore, such ambiguity 
should be readily avoided. 
C.  Potential for Abuse Can Be Limited by Other Legal Doctrines and 
Perfect Tender Rule Constraints 
Nothing in this Note should be taken to suggest that cases such as 
Neumiller Farms (which considered the falling market in determining that 
the buyer had made a bad faith rejection) reached an incorrect result; 
indeed the reverse is true.  As Professor Gillette opines, “If there were no 
other safety valve available to prevent the waste inherent in the possibility 
of rejections for trivial defects, use of the good faith obligation might 
therefore appear justifiable.”157  The problem that has been posited is that 
such cases inadvertently and unnecessarily complicate the issues.  Several 
other “safety valves” exist and should be utilized to produce clearer 
decisions in future falling market rejection cases. 
First and foremost, courts should recognize that they do not need to 
address the issue of good faith unless a legally significant non-conformity 
is found to exist.  Neumiller Farms is illustrative.  There, Neumiller Farms 
contracted for the purchase of potatoes suitable for chipping, and that is 
exactly what the court found it had received.158  Therefore, Neumiller 
                                                                                                                          
154 Id. 
155 Burton, Good Faith IV, supra note 46, at 1535. 
156 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
157 Gillette, supra note 46, at 653. 
158 Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d 272, 274–75 (Ala. 1979). 
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Farms had a contractual obligation to do as it had agreed.159  This should 
have ended the analysis.  It is irrelevant to inquire why Neumiller Farms 
performed the way it did or what market factors were to blame.  By 
discussing the falling market conditions and imploring notions of good 
faith, the court turned an easy case into a hard one.  Simply put, if a 
tendered good conforms to the terms of the parties’ bargain it should 
always be a breach for the buyer to reject delivery. 
In addition, courts should enforce the seller’s remedy of cure in 
appropriate cases.  Although, as stated in Part II, sellers often do not have 
any time allotted to make cure, sometimes they do.160  Buyers who 
recognize the possibility of a court finding them in breach for not 
permitting a seller to exercise its right to cure will be more willing to 
bargain and negotiate acceptable remedies without resorting to legal 
doctrines, and, more importantly, without using precious judicial resources 
to get there.  As Professor Gillette points out, “A buyer seeking to avoid 
his bad bargain would be unlikely to invest time or resources in 
discovering a nonmaterial defect if the known consequence of his rejection 
is to give the seller an additional opportunity to tender conforming 
goods.”161  To the extent that time for cure is still available, courts should 
fully utilize it. 
Further, although this Note has advocated that, in a general sense, it 
should not violate any broad standards of commercial dealing for a buyer 
to reject for small non-conformities when it suits his interests, the 
argument should not be read to dismiss reasonable commercial standards 
as an ineffective restraint on the perfect tender rule.  Indeed, commercial 
practices such as trade usage, course of performance, or course of dealing, 
may be very compelling on a case-by-case basis.  For example, a buyer 
who is contractually entitled to silver widgets but has always accepted 
bronze widgets from a particular seller should not be able to suddenly 
insist on silver simply because the price of widgets falls.  In that case, the 
parties would be said to have a clear course of performance establishing 
that bronze widgets are in fact conforming under the contract—the written 
terms notwithstanding—and, as such, the buyer would not be entitled to 
the right of rejection. 
Finally, the majority of the discussion throughout this Note has 
assumed a transaction involving two large sophisticated parties.  In this 
context we can, and should, readily expect these parties to take care of 
themselves.  These types of parties should not be able to use good faith as a 
means of crying foul in a falling market simply because they failed to 
                                                                                                                          
159 Id. 
160 See, e.g., Joc Oil USA, Inc., v. Consol. Edison Co., 434 N.Y.S.2d 623, 632 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1980) (stating that Joc Oil made “a reasonable and timely offer to cure”). 
161 Gillette, supra note 46, at 654. 
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properly plan their transactions with the necessary specificity in good 
economic times.  Given the resources of sophisticated commercial parties, 
it is not too much to ask them to safeguard their own interests.  It may, 
however, be too much to ask of a smaller, less sophisticated, buyer.  
Indeed, one plausible way of reconciling decisions protecting sellers in 
falling markets and those declining to, are that—as best the records 
indicated—the sellers in the former category tend to be smaller entities, 
while those in the latter category tend to be more sophisticated 
businesses.162 
If it is true that the real concern is protecting smaller sellers who lack 
the bargaining power to protect themselves from being exploited by unfair 
rejection in a falling market, then courts would be better served by simply 
saying as much.  Instead of accomplishing this aim through the obligation 
of good faith—which, under the revised U.C.C. section, one applies the 
same to all parties, whether merchant or non-merchant, sophisticated or 
unsophisticated—courts could use another doctrine that is more readily 
understood as a tool to alleviate otherwise harsh results for parties with 
disparate bargaining power: unconscionability.163  To the extent that a 
rejection right seems to give a large commercial buyer a patently unjust 
right of rejection over an individual seller with little bargaining position, it 
may be appropriate for courts to declare that right of rejection 
unconscionable under certain facts.164  This will achieve the same goal of 
protecting weaker parties, without undermining the clear application of the 
perfect tender rule to more sophisticated sellers who could have protected 
themselves—but chose not to—by bargaining for a more precise 
description of goods, or a longer time in which to tender them. 
                                                                                                                          
162 Compare Neumiller Farms, 368 So. 2d 272 (involving a dispute between individual potato 
farmers in DeKalb County, Alabama and a corporate buyer), and Printing Ctr. of Tex., Inc. v. 
Supermind Publ’g Co., 669 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App. 1984) (involving a dispute between an independent 
publisher and a local printing company), with Austrian Airlines Oesterreichische Luftverkehrs AG, v. 
UT Fin. Corp, 567 F. Supp. 2d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (involving a dispute between a multi-national 
airline and a multi-national conglomerate), and KCA Elecs., Inc. v. Legacy Elecs., Inc., No. G037285, 
2007 WL 2137959 (Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 2007) (involving a dispute between two high-tech California 
companies).  But see Oil Country Specialists, Ltd. v. Philipp Bros., 762 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App. 1988) 
(involving a dispute between two oil companies). 
163 See Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519, 1527 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(“The doctrine of unconscionability cannot be invoked by so sophisticated a party as [the plaintiff] in 
reference to a contract so laboriously negotiated.”); see also Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Processing, 
Inc., 527 F.2d 571, 576 (8th Cir. 1975) (noting that unconscionability does not protect a sophisticated 
investor); AMF Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 924, 930 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (finding 
unconscionability inapplicable in a contract between “large, sophisticated merchants”). 
164 Consider the following example: an adhesion contract between a large company and an 
individual seller that contained a vague description of the goods, which the large buyer then used to 
reject goods in a falling market at will, could potentially be deemed unconscionable. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Despite the fact that the issue of contested rejection of goods against 
the backdrop of a falling market for the goods is likely a reoccurring issue 
for many businesses, the issues presented have not been adequately 
resolved.  This is surely—at least in part—a function of businesses’ 
understandable reluctance to engage in costly litigation, especially when 
the harm caused by any particular contractual transgression often pales in 
comparison to the attention necessary to satisfy the business’s other 
obligations.  Hopefully, this Note represents a step in the direction of 
further examination, debate, and clarification.  The framework proposed is 
meant to be a subtle attempt to refine future judicial opinions to achieve a 
more focused pool of case law from which future business lawyers can 
discern precisely where their clients stand.  Though the framework 
suggested may appear to be pro-buyer, nothing argued in Part IV should be 
seen as particularly radical165 and to illustrate this point, this Note 
concludes by examining two previously discussed cases, Austrian Airlines 
(which supports this Note’s position) and Joc Oil USA (which does not) to 
see what would happen if the alternative rule had been applied to the facts. 
In Austrian Airlines, the court was unmoved by the seller’s evidence of 
a severe decline in the value of the plane, which was tendered and 
subsequently rejected by the buyer.  The defects to the plane included the 
lack of a required FAA Certificate of Airworthiness, without which the 
plane was useless.  If the court had found UTF’s rejection to be a bad faith 
effort to escape from the bargain, then its rejection of the plane would have 
been deemed an acceptance and it would have been the not-so-proud 
owner of a plane, the value of which had been severely deflated not just by 
uncontrollable market fluxuations, but also by the seller’s own incompetent 
ability to build it correctly.  Some readers may find no trouble with this 
result—it is, after all, hard to be outraged by the slight unfairness this 
would impose upon a sophisticated entity such as UTF.  However, this 
result is not contemplated by the contract that two sophisticated parties 
negotiated and entered into.  In the contract they struck, Austrian Airlines 
assumed the risk of failing to make perfect tender.  UTF obviously 
contemplated the value of the plane in the current market when making its 
decision to reject delivery, but the court was correct to hold that this was 
nothing more than a reasonable business decision based on a negotiated 
contract and that there was “no reason not to give the buyer the benefit of 
                                                                                                                          
165 Specifically, I do not wish to suggest any sort of departure from Professor Corbin’s wise 
admonition that “[t]he law seeks to be neutral between the competing interests of seller and buyer.”  
Instead, I strive only to promote a framework to accomplish, as Professor Corbin also advocates, the 
perfect tender rule’s purpose of “protect[ing] the buyers of goods against sellers who would be tempted 
to saddle buyers with unsuitable and defective goods if buyers could not reject.”  ARTHUR L. CORBIN, 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 33.3 (2009). 
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its bargain.”166 
In Joc Oil USA, the contract required delivery of oil meeting maximum 
sulfur content requirements with delivery during a specified period.  The 
seller delivered oil with sulfur in excess of this amount and the buyer 
rejected.  Since the stated time for performance had passed, the buyer 
refused to allow the seller any additional time to cure.  In finding that the 
seller had a reasonable basis to believe his initial tender would be 
acceptable, the court frequently referenced the sharp decline in the oil 
market as evidence of the buyer’s unsavory motives.167  Regardless of 
whether the court meant to suggest a rule of law that rejection for minor 
defects in a falling market could be grounds for a finding of bad faith, 
these passing comments did provide fodder for such claims.  In reality, the 
court never needed to go down the path of discussing the falling market for 
oil because, even without it, there was ample evidence to support the 
seller’s position. 
The court noted that the seller had no knowledge that the oil contained 
too much sulfur and, in fact, had received a report from their supplier 
indicating that the oil would conform.168  This would seem to satisfy the 
test advocated by White and Summers that the buyer be unaware of the 
defect despite his good faith and prudent business behavior.169  In addition, 
even under the more restrictive approach advocated by Nordstrom,170 the 
seller likely had reason to believe that his oil would be acceptable with a 
cash allowance because even the non-conforming shipment had a sulfur 
content within a range that the seller knew that the buyer was authorized to 
buy.171  From this evidence alone, the court could have inferred a 
reasonable basis to believe that the initial delivery would be acceptable.172 
Since the buyer failed to provide the seller with the additional time to 
cure, which the court found he was entitled to, it had breached the contract 
regardless of its motives.  Similarly, had the seller been unable to cure 
within a reasonable amount of additional time, then the buyer would have 
been fully within its rights—falling market or not—to reject delivery.  To 
do otherwise would run contrary to the parties’ contract and force the 
buyer to accept poorer quality oil, when it had already suffered the 
misfortune of seeing the value of its purchase decline in the world oil 
market. 
                                                                                                                          
166 Austrian Airlines, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 600. 
167 See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text. 
168 Joc Oil USA, Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 434 N.Y.S.2d. 623, 630 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). 
169 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 324. 
170 See NORDSTROM, supra note 35, at 321. 
171 Joc Oil USA, Inc., 434 N.Y.S.2d. at 626. 
172 If anything, the evidence of a falling market for oil, which the court included in this portion of 
its discussion, actually seems to cut the other way.  The seller’s knowledge that the market was falling 
should have made the possibility of the buyer’s rejection less of a surprise. 
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In short, no harm is caused by ignoring the presence of a falling market 
in a case where the buyer’s rejection has been contested; however, 
significant confusion, litigation, and unfairness to the contractual rights of 
buyers may result from its inclusion.  As such, courts would be prudent to 
follow decisions such as Austrian Airlines and KCA Electronics and make 
their perfect tender rule discussions more about the conformity of the 
goods and less about market conditions that have only a sentimental impact 
on the outcome. 
